JAPANESE RULE IN KOREA (1905–1910): A CASE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

Japan imposed a protectorate over Korea in 1905 and annexed this geopolitically strategic peninsular kingdom in 1910. During this five-year period, Japan tried to consolidate her rule in Korea as peacefully as possible. Given this objective, how successful were the Japanese authorities in coping with the existing social and political structure of traditional Korea for its achievement? This paper proposes to answer this question with regard to two elite groups of special interest in the transition period in Korean politics, the civilian and military sectors of the government.1

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE YI DYNASTY

The government of the Yi dynasty was in theory an absolute monarchy. All civil and military appointments down to the lowest level of administrative organization were supposedly made with the monarch’s sanction from among those who succeeded in the competitive examinations based on the Chinese classics or military arts.2 The monarch’s council (Uichongbu) in assisting his rule was conventionally constituted of the Prime Minister (Lyonguichong) and the Senior and Junior Ministers of State or Left (Choa)

1 See Conroy, Hilary, The Japanese seizure of Korea, 1868–1910, a study of realism and idealism in international relations, especially chap. 7, 379–380, Philadelphia, Univ. of Penna. Press, 1960. “What was Ito’s plan—It was not annexation and not brutal tyranny. It was to establish a sort of triangular balance, Residency General, Korean Court, and Korean reform ministry, through which Japanese-Korean co-operation could obtain to produce reform and modernization of Korea and which would render Japan secure from any possible threat launched via Korea.”

This very recent work of Professor Conroy’s is comprehensive and well documented, but it leaves relatively untouched the administrative and technical side of Japan’s control process in Korea between 1905 and 1910. A parallel study to the latter part of Professor Conroy’s work that covers the 1905–1910 period will be found in the author’s Japan in Korea (1905–1910): the techniques of political power, Stanford Univ. Ph.D. Thesis, 1959.


and Right (U) (uichong), known collectively as the three dukes (Samkong). The council functioned as the ultimate tribunal of all affairs. In addition, the chief central administrative organ was composed of six boards (Cho)—Civil Office, Revenue, Ceremonies, War, Punishments, and Works. The Home Office and the Foreign Office were added to these boards later (in 1882–1884). The Office of the Censor, quite independent and ranking equally with that of the Prime Minister, was a special organ to scrutinize the acts of the ministers of state and even of the monarch himself.3

The monarch was also supreme commander-in-chief and kept the disposition of troops in his hands. In traditional Korea, however, emphasis was placed on civilian supremacy, and in the government hierarchy the military was given lower ranking as compared with the civilian officials. Very often the Department of War was headed by a scholar-official.

As to the military establishments, the monarch had his armed bodyguards, and each province its provincial forces under at least one military and naval commander-in-chief, since both titles pertained, ex officio, to the governor. In some provinces, a professional soldier was appointed to the commanding post in addition to the governor, but only to assist the latter.4

The country was then divided into eight administrative provinces with respect to regional diversities and economically autonomous character, and each province was again subdivided into smaller units of local government.5 Local officials were vested with judicial and administrative powers. These local officials were under the


4 Ibid. See also Ouchi, Takeji, Richo Makki no Noson (Agricultural villages in the last years of the Yi dynasty), Keijo Teikoku Daigaku Hobun Gakkai (ed.), Chosen Shakai Keizai Shi Kenkyu (Korean Socio-Economic Research) 6: 17–18, Tokyo, 1933.

5 McCune, Shannon, Korea’s heritage, 31, Rutland and Tokyo, Tuttle, 1956.
surveillance of the monarch’s secret agents who visited various parts of the country for the purpose of examining everything on the monarch’s behalf.6

In practice, however, the Korean government under the Yi dynasty was authoritarian without well-defined machinery for centralization. All the authority was supposed to emanate from the Emperor, but local autonomy was encouraged. The welfare function of the government was minimal, though it collected rather heavy taxes. The people, 85 per cent agrarian, poor, ignorant, and politically inert and impotent, providing for themselves whatever services they needed, developed strong provincialism. There was no such thing as national consciousness.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS

Events followed very quickly after the abdication of the Korean Emperor in 1907 as an aftermath of the incident of the Korean secret mission to The Hague Peace Conference. On July 24, 1907, Korea signed a new treaty with Japan by which all the prerogatives on internal affairs were legally surrendered into the hands of the Resident-General. As published, it was intended on the whole to legalize what had been practiced since the establishment of the Residency-General, in December, 1905. Referring to the new agreement, Okuma, a Japanese leader, indicated his belief that it had not strengthened Japan’s position in Korea. However, at the same time, a secret memorandum was agreed upon between the two governments for the disbandment of the Korean “defense” forces and for the reorganization of the Korean central administration and judicial system.7

In pursuance of the treaty of July 24, 1907, the Japanese who had served as advisers to the Korean government were incorporated in the Korean central administrative system as assistant ministers in the respective departments, and other Japanese were employed in various capacities by the Korean government. The following table shows their numbers and distribution and their proportion to the Korean officials by December 31, 1908, as indicated in the Resident-General’s official report (table 1).

These figures are self-explanatory, but it should be pointed out that there were more Japanese officials than Korean in the Departments of Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. No Japanese officials were listed in the Department of the Army, but the reason is obvious as the Korean army was disbanded in August, 1907, and the Koreans kept in the Army Department were eventually discharged in toto with its abolishment on July 31, 1909. The figures of the Home Department officials also seem not to include the police force, because there were, in 1908, 4,477 constables and officers (1,719 Japanese and 2,758 Koreans) reported in the Japanese statistical yearbook.8 Furthermore, the reason for there being more Korean officials in the Home Department than Japanese, as will be shown later, was that local government officials under the jurisdiction of the Home Department were predominantly Korean.

As a whole, the Japanese officials employed in the Korean government by December 31, 1908, came to 40.7 per cent. And, within the high officials, 36.9 per cent were Japanese; whereas as

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6 Wilkinson, op. cit., 22.
7 Nihon, Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabi Shuyo Bunsho (The annals of Japanese foreign affairs and important documents) 1: 276-277, Tokyo, 1955. See also Ito to Saionji, July 25, 1907, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (Library of Congress microfilm) MT 2.4.1.9: 463. (This Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives microfilmed for the Library of Congress will be hereafter cited as “Japanese Foreign Office (microfilm).”

8 Nihon, Naikaku Tokeikyoku, Nihon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Japanese Statistical Yearbook), table 728, Tokyo, 1914.
many as 42.2 per cent of the subordinate officials were Japanese despite the fact that local officials remained predominantly Korean.

At the same time, the Residency-General's office was reorganized in order to avoid functional duplication with the Korean government, but still it employed altogether 4,781 high and subordinate officials and employees.9 (Included in this figure are some Koreans—454 as interpreters and 577 as letter-carriers, in the Communications Bureau; and more than one thousand in the Railway Bureau as day laborers or petty employees.) This is indeed a substantial increase. In 1906 all officials and employees in the office of the Residency-General and all the Residencies would have amounted to fewer than 500 men, including the police force attached to them.10

The government employment of Japanese in Korea increased at a high rate after 1906, and in 1908 almost "unlimited employment" of the Japanese was complained of by the Koreans and even by some Japanese in the Korean government service.11 One of the reasons for this rapid growth in the number of Japanese government workers in Korea was undoubtedly the expansion of the functions of government. However, another reason, probably more important than the first for the Japanese side, was to assure administrative efficiency on the assumption that the Japanese officials had better administrative training than the Korean. And yet, the knowledge of administrative techniques alone without an understanding of human relations did not prove effective in administration.12 Meantime, many Korean bureaucrats lost their jobs.

Moreover, priority given to Japanese-speaking Koreans in the Korean government service regardless of their administrative knowledge was bitterly denounced by educated Koreans, especially by those who were becoming educated in the United States.13 Some Koreans also looked askance at the higher salary and other material inducements afforded the Japanese employed in government service, who were even paid more than those in Japan. For the high officials the rate was 50 per cent higher and for subordinate officials 80 per cent higher than that of the same ranks in Japan.14

The rate of change at the center and the upper strata of the political pyramid was necessarily slowed down when it reached the local and village level. The Japanese authority in Korea stated:

By various reform measures and by the appointment of competent Japanese to important offices, the administration of the Central Government and the Imperial Household has been brought into fairly good shape... The progress of reforms in local administration, however, is slow, in spite of the fact that a number of reform measures have been introduced.15

By Imperial Ordinance on September 28, 1906, the local administration was reorganized into 13 provinces, 11 prefectures, and 333 districts. Seoul, the capital, was one of the 11 prefectures. By December, 1909, there were 13 provinces, 11 prefectures, 317 districts, and 4,322 myun[myon] as administrative units. Seoul being classified as a special prefecture.16 To the Japanese authority in Korea, these local administrative divisions were simply extensions of the central administrative units and could scarcely be said to possess local autonomy. Therefore, at the beginning, local government reforms were aimed at the centralization of local management and control and the transfer of taxation, judiciary, and policing powers, which had been vested in the local officials, to the agencies of the central government.17 There was, moreover, a Local Civil Service Supervising Committee in the Home Department in 1906. But no personnel change at the local level in favor of pro-Japanese elements was planned at the time.18 This committee was abolished in June, 1907, and instead the local Civil Service Qualifications In-

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10 Ibid. (1907), 31.
11 Furutani to Ishizuka, October 31, 1908, The Japanese Archives in Korea, 1894-1910, photographed for the Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ., 384: 44-45. Hereafter cited as "JA (Korea)."
12 Ibid. See also North China Herald, October 2, 1909, quoted in Kenki (Gendarmery secret report), October 16, 1909, JA (Korea) 357: 179-181.
13 Kenki (Gendarmery secret report), March 20, 1909, ibid, 352: 106.
14 Furutani to Ishizuka, October 31, 1908, ibid. 284: 44-45. See also Annual report (1908-1909), 49.
15 Ibid.
16 Chosenshi Gakukai, Chosenshi Taikei: Kindai Shiki (An outline of Korean history—modern period), 136, Keijo, 1928; Chosen Chusatsu Kenpei Shireibu, Chosen Shakai Ko (Analysis of Korean society), 6-8, Keijo, 1912.
18 Kuzu, Yoshihisa, Nikkan Gappo Hishi (Secret history of the merger of Japan and Korea) 1: 200, Tokyo, 1930.
specting Committee was established in the Home Department on November 28, 1908.\textsuperscript{19}

The Japanese authority in Korea soon found out that the new central agencies for collecting taxes and for other purposes had to depend on the same local administrative instruments as those of old Korea to achieve any results.\textsuperscript{20} There were various reasons for this incapacity of the Japanese-appointed new central government agents. To begin with, many of them were unfamiliar with the localities for which they were responsible. In some cases, the local officials and bureaucrats in the existing administrative machinery reacted against change, as well as against the new officials, and proved non-cooperative.\textsuperscript{21} Above all, the peculiar framework of the local administration in traditional Korea made it very unorthodox to seek the cooperation of the local bureaucrats by legal action, for they (the ajun level and below) were neither appointed nor paid by the central government.\textsuperscript{22} They took their share from the taxes which they collected; and sometimes their positions in the village were merely honorary.

In May, 1908, Song Pyong-jun, the founder of the Ilchinhoe, a pro-Japanese Korean political organization, was given the portfolio of the Home Department, and the Residency-General and the Korean government summoned conferences of provincial governors and provincial secretaries at Seoul respectively in May and June. Most of the governors, according to a report, "expressed their desire to recover the power of taxation and police and to obtain greater administrative discretion."\textsuperscript{23} In compliance with their request, or more likely because of administrative expediency, the centralization of local administration was in some degree relaxed, and to the governor was restored the power to recommend "candidates for the post of district magistrate, from among those residing within his jurisdictional province," and to appoint, promote, or dismiss Chusa (subordinate officials) "with the exception of Japanese appointed in that capacity." The police function was also partially restored to the Governor, and the provincial Police Department, though usually under a Japanese police inspector, was attached to the Governor.\textsuperscript{24}

At the same time, when the relaxation of central control of local administration took place, seven out of thirteen governors were replaced and the remainder were transferred to other places "according to their special qualifications."\textsuperscript{25} Out of one hundred thirty-three magistrates in all, forty-four were newly appointed, forty-nine dismissed, and twenty-seven transferred to other places "during six months from July 1, 1908."\textsuperscript{26} The policy of appointing "a competent Japanese" as a subordinate official in each magistracy was initiated in 1909.

On the whole, it can be said that there was less effort exerted in producing a replica of the Japanese government in Korea at the local than at the central level; and the change of local personnel with Japanese policy re-orientation in Korea since July, 1907, was accelerated, but it was far less complete. Japanese control at the local level was mainly through indirectness, with the use of the Japanese-controlled police force and gendarmery and by the manipulation of a pro-Japanese political organization, the Ilchinhoe, if we can call Japanese control at the center of Korean politics a form of direct control.

\section*{CONTROL OF THE MILITARY}

Korean soldiers took part in the Seoul riot following the abdication of the Korean Emperor, and soon afterward, Ito, the first Japanese Resident-General in Korea reported to Tokyo the restlessness of the Korean army.\textsuperscript{27} As stated earlier, the agreement between the Korean government and the Resident-General on July 24, 1907, provided for disbanding the Korean army. This agreement was kept so secret that Sammons, the American

\textsuperscript{19} Annual report (1908–1909), 55–56.
\textsuperscript{20} Tax collection in Korea, op. cit., 366–376.
\textsuperscript{21} Kankoku Chiho Seikyo (Local political situation in Korea), Ito to Hayashi, June 22, 1907, Japanese Foreign Office (microfilms) MT 1.5.3.11: 122–138; Ishizuka to Ito, December 28, 1908, ibid., 193–200. See also Kankoku Genji ni okeru Chiho Jinshin no Yokyo (The political attitude of the local populace at present in Korea), November 1, 1909, J.A (Korea) 305: 24–26. For the same report from the Kunsan Residency, see ibid. 318: 5–8, 26–27, 32; from the Inchon Residency, see ibid. 316: 30–31, 45–45, 56–57.
\textsuperscript{22} See Hulbert, op. cit., 52–56. Ajun, a word of native origin, originally meant any government officer; but as the practice of selecting local officials from among the residents was given up and as very often local officials ignorant of the locality were appointed, the word came to mean the residential local government bureaucrats.
\textsuperscript{23} Annual report (1908–1909), 49.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{27} Ito to Chinda, related to Saionji, July 21, 1907, J.A (Korea) 270: 43–44. See also Japanese Foreign Office (microfilms) MT 2.4.1.9: 305–306; Maruyama to [?], July 20, 1907, ibid., 330; Hayashi to Saionji, July 24, 1907, ibid., 378–380.
Consul General in Seoul, complained that he was not officially notified of it until about two hours after the Seoul mutiny.  

On the morning of August 1, some of the superior officers of the Korean army in Seoul, already deprived of their arms, were summoned by General Hasegawa, Commander of the Japanese garrison force, and the rescript ordering their disbandment was read to them by the Korean Minister of War, Yi Pyong-mu. “Our existing army, which is composed of mercenaries, is unfit for the purposes of national defense,” and the disbandment was to make way “for the eventual formation of an efficient army.”  

They were told to assemble their men in the Seoul Central Drill Quarter without arms and dismiss them after paying gratuities. Their weapons were to be seized in their absence. Some of the promising commissioned and non-commissioned officers were to serve with the infantry palace bodyguard of one battalion strength. Some were to be sent to the cadet school and some to be incorporated into the Japanese army.  

One officer, Major Pak Se-han, “Commander of the smartest and best of the Korean battalions,” committed suicide in anger and desperate protest upon his return to his command. His men rose in mutiny, having been informed of what had happened, and another battalion followed suit. They then secured weapons and cartridges by breaking into the ammunition room, nearly killing their Japanese military instructors, and started firing at the Japanese. Japanese infantry companies were dispatched hurriedly to the scene and for three and one-half hours, the Korean soldiers fought, finally surrendering at a bayonet charge by the Japanese infantry. The extent of the fighting can be visualized by the following casualty list. When the mutiny was put down, there were twelve Korean officers and fifty-six others dead, five officers and forty-four others wounded, and about five hundred sixteen captured. On the other hand, the loss inflicted upon the Japanese forces was one officer and two non-commissioned officers dead and forty others dead and wounded.  

Meanwhile, the disbandment ceremony was conducted speedily in the presence of four Japanese companies. Many Korean soldiers, embracing each other, wept indignantly, but others dispersed peacefully, seemingly satisfied with the good sum of money they had received.  

The rest of the Korean army distributed through the country was disbanded separately between August 3 and December 3, 1907. The accompanying map shows the position of the local Korean army stations throughout the country. The Kwanghwa outpost station of the Suwan regiment rose in mutiny against the disbandment.  

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28 Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, August 1, 1907, U. S. Dep't of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Japan, No. 145, case 1166.  
33 McKenzie, _op. cit._, 161.
order, but was quickly suppressed by the Japanese garrison force. The Wonsan regiment prior to disbandment stole weapons and escaped. All the others were reported as having peacefully followed the order. However, after their gratuities had been spent, the rebellious and many other disbanded and unemployed Korean soldiers dispersed throughout the peninsula and joined Korean rebels who had been sporadically fighting, under the name of Uibyon (the Righteous Army), against the Japanese forces since the conclusion of the protectorate treaty. This Righteous Army existed in name only by July, 1907, owing to successful Japanese subjugation, and it was in a way revived by the addition of new recruits from among the recently disbanded unemployed Korean soldiers. In some cases, these disbanded soldiers became drill-masters in schools in various localities.

In 1904 it was reported that the Korean standing army contained about 17,000 men trained in “European methods.” However, because of the intervening Japanese reduction of its size, between 1904 and 1905, the Korean army altogether numbered only about 9,000 men with 311 officers at the time of its disbandment.

Despite their low social and political standing compared with the civilian officials, these 311 officers have been classified as the members of the ruling class in Korea since they were definitely recruited from it. The rest of the men, without prestige and often underpaid and mistreated, were variously recruited from among the commoners—from the landless peasants, from the men in the peddlers’ guilds, and from the mountain tiger hunters skilled in the use of fire arms. Some were forced into the ranks as soldiers. Those who were not forced to join did so to find an outlet for their social and political, if not their personal, frustrations. By joining the military service, they did not become members of the ruling class, but they had a better opportunity of obtaining official recognition and of sharing the values of the ruling class and the elite groups of the country.

They were untrained and unequipped. We recall that one of the first reform efforts of the Korean government was to modernize the Korean army, and even as late as 1905, the government expenditure for the Department of the Army amounted to 2,466,447 yen out of the total of 7,123,815. Still, at the time of the Korean army disbandment, the American Consul General in Seoul observed that Korean troops were “an uncertain quality, unreliable, and apt to join with a mob in a crisis”; but they were soldiers by profession, who in the past had exhibited courage and skill in fighting.

By suddenly disbanding the Korean army, therefore, Japan in Korea eliminated any possibility of organized resistance to Japanese rule by the Korean military, but at the same time provided good reserves for the rebel force, since many of the demobilized men eventually allied themselves with the Righteous Army. By being allied with the rebel force for their livelihood, if not strictly on the basis of their anti-Japanese feeling, they could live honorably on the dole of Korean sympathizers, as they were supposed to be fighting the Japanese. Indeed, there was no place other than the Righteous Army where the disbanded Korean soldiers could easily employ their professional skills without incurring a sense of shame or guilt. Later, when the Japanese authorities belatedly sought Korean assistance for the subjugation of the rebels by recruiting Korean assistants to the Japanese-controlled police and gendarmerie, many of the recruits may have been former soldiers seeking re-employment by the government in the name of peace and order.

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84 Chosenshi Kakukai, op. cit., 218. See also Hasegawa to Ito, September 7, 1907, JA (Korea) 274: 46-48. The Japanese Foreign Office (microfilms) MT 24.1.9: sects 3-5 have an extensive—almost daily—reporting on the Korean army disbandment process and on the subjugation of rebels. Much of this military report—probably more systematically and in detail—has been reproduced in Chosen Chusatsugun Shireibu, Chosen Boto Tobatsu Shi (Records on the subjugation of Korean rebels), op. cit. It was not for public use.


86 U. S. Dep’t of Commerce and Labor, op. cit., 2456.

87 Chosenshi Gakkai, op. cit., 216. See also First General Report on Korean Finances, enclosed Morgan to Root, November 27, 1905, U. S. Dep’t of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Korea, No. 22.

88 Longford, Joseph H., The story of Korea, 140, New York, Scribner’s Sons, 1911; Griffis, William E., Corea, the hermit nation, 42, 43, 325, 416, New York, Scribner’s Sons, 1907.

89 (Residency-General’s Office), Kankoku Zaisei Shisetsu Koyo (The essential aspects of Japanese financial administration in Korea), 17-18, 32-44, Keijo, 1910.

90 Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, August 1, 1907, U. S. Dept. of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Japan, No. 145, case 1166.

91 For a fuller treatment of the composition of the rebel forces, see the author’s Japan in Korea (1905–1910): The techniques of political power, 206 ff., op. cit.
CONCLUSION

What can be called a genuine mass disturbance immediately prior to or after the conclusion of the protectorate treaty and the abdication of the Korean Emperor occurred only in the capital, Seoul, and no mass disturbance was reported in other places. This reveals both the geographical configuration and the degree of political awareness within the populace and the degree of allegiance to the ruling oligarchy.

After the conclusion of the protectorate treaty, however, there was some locally organized opposition to Japanese overlordship in the southern provinces of Korea. In most cases, it was sporadic and lacked centralized direction. Gordon Paddock, the American Consul General, pointed out the exaggerated reports of these examples of local opposition and he speculated that they were occasioned by the ill-treatment of Koreans by Japanese settlers and by the abuse of the semi-official and pro-Japanese group known as the Ichinho.42

Of the three locally organized opposition groups two were led by former high government officials and the other was organized by a minor government official. The two former high government officials were Min Chong-sik in Hongchu, south Ch'ungch'ong province, and Ch'oe Ik-hyon in Sunch'ang, north Cholla province. They were subsequently captured and their forces of about 500 and 450 men respectively were dispersed. The other group in north Kyongsang province with a strength of about 1,000 men and led by Sin Ul-sok was still operating in 1907, but before long his force was also dispersed by a successful campaign of Japanese and Korean forces.43 By 1907, therefore, all of the local opposition, organized or unorganized, was suppressed, but the most distressing local resistance followed the tightening of Japanese control in Korea and especially the disbandment of the Korean army after July, 1907.

The real strength of the rebel force after July, 1907, is very difficult to estimate. It was reported, however, that it numbered approximately 50,000 at the end of 1907, 70,000 in 1908, 28,000 in 1909, and 19,000 in 1910.44 As to the composition of the rebel leadership, table 2 gives some of the leaders' previous occupations. The above table would be more meaningful if we knew the previous occupations of more of these rebel leaders, but still there is a clear indication that former officials and the military played a leading role in the latter stages of the rebel movement against Japan's effort to secure control of Korea during this period.45

In the end, Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Under the circumstances, this was an almost inevitable outcome. Japan wanted to execute the process as peacefully as possible, and this objective was made abundantly clear by the appointment of Prince Ito the first Resident General in Korea, as he, more than anyone else among the leading contemporary Japanese policy-makers, abhorred strong handed methods in Korea. On the whole, however, Japanese authorities showed no knowledge of the traditional Korean social and political framework and had no systematic scheme of implementing their objective. The execution of their policy with regard to Korea was mostly a trial and error process. And, in order to stop the scheming of the Korean Court against Japanese rule and suppress the Korean rebels led mostly by unemployed former civilian and military officials, the Japanese authorities wittingly or unwittingly developed a colonial military dictatorship over Korea that lasted until 1945.

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42 Paddock to Wright, July 7, 1906, enclosed Paddock to Assistant Secretary of State, July 10, 1906, U. S. Dept. of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Japan, No. 145, case 1166.
43 Chosen Chusatsugun Shireibu, op. cit., 10. For the identification of Sin Ul-sok, see Chomei naru Kankoku Boto no Shuryo Chosa (The survey of chief rebel leaders in Korea), Japanese Foreign Office (microfilms) MT 2.4.1.9: 1787-1792.
45 See Ito's Deputy Chief of General Affairs at Seoul, Tsuruhara's Report to the Foreign Office, December, 1907, Japanese Foreign Office (microfilms) MT 2.4.1.9: 1309-1315.