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# THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Joan Robinson

IT would be absurd for a foreigner to pretend fully to understand the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but it may be useful to offer an attempt to translate its strange terminology into familiar language. What is the meaning of *a party person in authority taking the capitalist road*? How can class war persist when there are no owners of private property to exploit the workers? How can the leader of an established government proclaim that *Rebellion is justified*? What is the army doing in a *triple alliance* with the workers and the administration of a factory or a research institute? How does the thought of Mao Tse-tung make crops grow on a stony hill?

## THE RIGHTISTS

To begin with party persons in authority, whom we may call simply rightists for short—we are not intended to believe that anyone was proposing to restore capitalism in a literal sense. They were not proposing to sell State enterprises to financiers and re-open the Stock Exchange. The chief targets of criticism, at every level, were members of the Communist Party, in executive positions, who were accused of carrying out their work in an authoritarian manner, developing a superior attitude to the workers, forming gangs to protect each other, and taking advantage of their position to gain privilege and amenities for themselves. If they form a class, it is that class of bureaucrats, managers and Party organisers which grows up in a planned economy. Can this properly be called *restoring capitalism*?

In the Chinese conception of capitalism there are two aspects. Mao Tse-tung has developed Marxist theory in accord with experience and common sense. Accepting the dichotomy between the *base* of a social system, determined by the manner in which production is organised, and the *superstructure* of institutions, traditions and habits of thought, he shows how the superstructure may react upon the base: *Ideas may become a material force*. Contrariwise, when the base is changed, the superstructure will not automatically transform itself accordingly.

The base of capitalism is personal property in the means of production, which yields *rentier* income and gives private enterprise control over economic development. Inequality in consumption, the love of rank, status and power, untrammelled individualism and a social hierarchy

based on wealth, belong to the superstructure. Similarly, the base of socialism is State ownership and control of industry; the superstructure requires acquisitiveness to be replaced by a spirit of service. According to the Chinese view, Russian experience shows that a capitalist-type superstructure can grow up on a socialist base. When there are no capitalists to run industry and direct investment, the state develops organs to take over these functions, and the individuals put into control of them may suffer deformations of character sometimes even more unpleasant, from the point of view of socialist ideals, than those of the old bourgeoisie.

*Taking the capitalist road* must be interpreted primarily in terms of the superstructure. But a capitalist-type superstructure inevitably tends to erode a socialist base. The observation that ideas may become a material force cuts both ways. In the Soviet Union, the old middle class was pretty thoroughly wiped out. The new class developed afresh. In China, a great part of the middle class welcomed the victory of the Communists over the miserable, corrupt régime of the Kuomintang; they were willing to work with the new government in reconstructing the country; at the same time, they were necessary to it, since the mass of peasants who had won the civil war could not provide the personnel to run the administration, to develop industry and, least of all, to man, the greatly extended education services that the new régime required. Many middle-class people 'turned over' and believed that they had become socialists, but the change did not always go deep. In China the rightists in the Party could find sympathy and support in the old middle-class, and indeed were often of middle-class origin themselves. There were feudal remnants too—dispossessed landlords who had never been reconciled to their fate, and who handed to their sons maps and title deeds to show them what their inheritance ought to have been. These also provided allies for the rightists. Once an erosion of the base set in it might go very far.

At every level, in the Chinese Party and administration, rightists were ensconced in positions of authority. At the top was an organised group, evidently with wide ramifications, who were preparing to take power. There was no need for a coup. Liu Shao-chi had been appointed as the successor to Mao Tse-tung in due constitutional form. They had only to wait for the moment when they would be free to set about running the country according to their ideas. Meanwhile, Mao was an indispensable figurehead, but the organisation men could gradually get their supporters into place and gain more and more control over policy.<sup>1</sup> This was particularly important in the field of education. In principle, education

<sup>1</sup> The Chinese public are taught to revere Stalin as a great socialist, whereas we think of him as the very archetype of the organisation man. (His profile, so grim to us, appears on many a hoarding, as one of the prophets of the Old Testament, with

was being democratised but in practice it was building up an élite. The children of the old middle class naturally had an advantage over the children of peasants and workers as long as the old style of formal education and formal examinations was preserved; under guise of maintaining academic standards, class stratification was being solidified.

Under attack, the rightists resorted to what were regarded by their opponents as knavish tricks, but they were not merely scoundrels; they had a point of view; it can be glimpsed between the lines of the accusations made against them.

It was something like this: Mao's ideas were fine for leading a peasant army but they are not appropriate to running a modern state. The Great Leap was an irresponsible adventure, for which a heavy price was paid in the three bad years that followed. (The rightists refused to recognise the return in increased production later enjoyed on the great investments which threw the economy off balance while they were being made in 1958, or to acknowledge that the communes have been vindicated by the continuous increase in harvests since 1962.) The rightists insist upon the need for organisation and authority. Every army and every industry in the world is run on the basis of a chain of command from the top downwards. That those in a higher grade in the hierarchy should have a more comfortable standard of life than those below is not only excusable but desirable, since it adds prestige to authority. The workers need tutelage; obedience and diligence are required of them; they are none the better for having their heads full of political wind. The task of industrialisation must be carried out fast. It is nonsense to wait till the mass of the population are educated. We must build up a corps of managers and civil servants quickly; that means that we must draw upon the old lettered class, even if they were landlords or reactionaries in the past. In the arts, the dominance of politics produces a dreary philistinism and in literature a stupid black and white morality, smothering the subtlety and grace of Chinese traditions under what even Mao deprecates as the 'slogan and poster style'.

Behind all this lurks a more solid point. How can China stand alone in the face of the hideous threat of American aggression? Mere prudence dictates some ideological concessions to the Soviets (which, indeed,

Marx, Engels and Lenin.) Khrushchev, who to us has certain sympathetic features, is the archtypal traitor to the Chinese, for he abandoned the international struggle against imperialism to butter up the Americans. There is a curious convention in Chinese politics of not naming anyone by his name until his status has been officially pronounced upon. As long as he remains in limbo, Liu Shao-chi is referred to as *the Chinese Khrushchev*. For us this has the wrong associations. Perhaps the contradictions can be reconciled by saying that Stalin saved the base of socialism in the Soviet Union, but did irreparable damage to the superstructure; while Khrushchev in trying to repair the superstructure only succeeded in damaging the base.

the rightists would welcome for their own sake) to regain the support of a powerful ally.

Arguments such as these may touch a responding chord in many Western breasts, but in China today all questions are reduced to one: Is this the road back to capitalism or on to socialism?

#### THE STRUGGLE

The preliminary skirmishes against the position of the rightists took the form of articles criticising some literary works which were accused of making covert attacks upon the Chairman in various disguises. Peng Chen, the Mayor of Peking, had been leading a committee to discuss the question of socialist culture (this was the origin of the name Cultural Revolution, which now has a much wider meaning). He produced a pussyfooting report (without consulting his colleagues) which was repudiated by the Central Committee in a document published on May 16, 1966. This gave a hint to a number of people whose suspicions had been aroused by difficulties in their own work, that there was something wrong on high. The familiar method of venting individual opinions by writing posters was used for an attack upon the head of Peking University published on June 1, 1966. This has come to be regarded as the first shot fired in the Cultural Revolution. The movement quickly spread to other institutions, and was soon followed by an outbreak in a number of factories of criticism of leading Party men in their administration.

The rightists reacted sharply. Using the authority of the Party, they appealed to the biddable majority and isolated the rebels. The counter-attack was picturesquely described as a *white terror*. For the most part it consisted only in abusing the dissidents and confusing their minds with the argument that to attack a representative of the Party is to attack the Chairman himself. In some places it was pretty rough. In some, the rightists, getting rattled, only made fools of themselves; at one institute, for example, they ordered the service staff to cut off electricity and close the students' canteen. Their opponents worked by candlelight and built themselves a cooking stove.

In many institutions and enterprises these rebels were pressed very hard, but they evidently had allies higher up. The Principal of Peking University was dismissed, and the Party Committee of the city was reorganised.

All this while Mao Tse-tung was out of town. The only overt comment he made upon the situation was to swim the Yangtse so as to indicate that he had not yet got one foot in the grave. It would be implausible to suppose that he was waiting to see who would win. If the first spark of rebellion had been stamped out he could have tossed in a hand grenade at any moment. He was evidently leaving time for

the rightists to expose themselves and for the rebels to show what they were made of. In August he returned to Peking and wrote his own poster, under the title *Bombard the Headquarters*. The spectacle of the head of a government (which the Chairman is, in fact if not in form) inciting rebellion against the administration does not fit in with the constitutional notions that we are used to. The Chinese do not seem to find it odd or think that it needs any particular explanation. This is what has most caused misunderstanding in the West, and has permitted the press to represent the whole affair as mere chaos and disintegration.

Mao Tse-tung's return to Peking fanned the spark which the rightists were trying to stamp out. Rebel groups and Red Guard contingents proliferated, splitting and amalgamating as they grew.

On August 8 the Cultural Revolution was formally adopted as Party policy. The Central Committee promulgated the guidelines for it, which became known as the Sixteen Points.<sup>2</sup> Rebels took heart; Red Guards flooded into Peking and Mao Tse-tung put himself at their head. The movement, however, was still bubbling up from below, with little control from above. The limits set by the Sixteen Points, which are moderate and humane, were often overpassed.

Bringing out the Red Guards was killing two birds with one stone. For some years there has been talk of the problem of the third generation, the *lucky children* who take New China for granted and begin to think of what they can get out of it for themselves rather than of what their fathers gave to build it. There was some danger that trying to mould them by means of continual preaching would only produce a set of little prigs. Now the whole generation of teenagers and students have been plunged into the revolution and become committed to it. Running their organisations without the aid of grown ups, and later in Long Marches, they learned more about socialism and about China in a few weeks than they could ever have learned from reading pious stories at home. (It remains to be seen if they will fulfil the promise to make up for the formal schooling they have lost by shortening courses without a lowering of standards.)

The Red Guards were all very well, but the real job had to be done by the industrial workers. All down the line there were Party members in the highest positions at each level, who, whether they had organisational connections with the centre of the web or had merely acquired a taste for power on their own, were ready to put up a fight for their positions and for the Party apparatus to which they were attached. Honest Party members at lower levels were bewildered. On the one hand a Plenary Session of the Central Committee had promulgated the Sixteen Points, on the other hand they had been trained in implicit,

<sup>2</sup> Cf. below, p. 224.

unquestioning obedience to the direction of the Party conveyed to each from the grade above him. Many remained immobilised by mental conflict right through. Some saw the light, earlier or later. (One important group, the municipal officials in Shanghai, joined the rebels in November 1966.) A few declared for the rebels from the start and had to stand the racket of Party discipline for doing so.

There was a long, tough struggle between the rightists and the rebel groups in the factories, rising to the level of city and provincial governments. There were serious clashes in some places where the rightists had mobilised mass support for themselves. At one stage they resorted to what is not very happily called *economism*—paying bonus wages and promoting apprentices to full pay. Groups of workers were sent off to Peking for a shopping spree, until the favourite luxuries, such as woollen cloth and wireless sets, had to be removed from the counters. The rebels overcame this attack; workers were obliged to return the goods and paid back the money to their enterprises.

There were many dramatic episodes in the year-long struggle up and down the country, many strange personal tales, many reversals and counter-reversals. Much is obscure even to those who lived through it. Looking in from outside, I offer the comment that this was the first example of a new kind of class war (though inspired from above)—a revolt of the new proletariat of workers in socialist enterprises and peasants turned commune members against the incipient new class of organisation men in the Communist Party.

The melodramatic and sometimes farcical aspects of the Red Guard movement have distracted attention from its importance in political strategy. By setting the young people on to criticise high and low, the Chairman could smoke out his adversaries in the Central Committee and sever their lines of support without splitting the Party. The old guerrilla had not lost his cunning.

Though the victims of the revolution were all 'party persons in authority', no suggestion was allowed of an attack on the Party as such. The first and most often recited of the quotations in the little red book is 'The force at the core leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party'. Furthermore, identification of the rightists with the old bourgeoisie blurred the issue in the popular mind.

In China today the classes are not defined by birth. An old mandarin or an ex-landlord may be an honorary proletarian; in contrast, some of the most vicious of the organisation men were ex-poor peasants corrupted by power. Class is defined by a state of mind, and the state of mind is revealed in conduct. Individuals who were caught on the wrong side are invited to change their thinking. The directives of the Sixteen

Points narrow the target of attack to a small handful of incorrigibles—and even they are directed to ‘remould themselves through productive labour’. (Normally, at the end of 1967 they were working at the bench in the same factories which they were formerly bossing about.) For obvious reasons, scientists of bourgeois origin are to be protected and kept out of the conflict.

#### THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The adventure of launching the Cultural Revolution and allowing the popular movement to boil up as it might, was not so dangerous as it may seem, for all the while the People's Liberation Army was at long stop, in case things should go wrong. In the first phase, troops intervened only occasionally to separate rival groups of rightists and rebels who had come to actual blows; the soldiers were without arms, so that they suffered more casualties than the contestants. When production or transport was disorganised, army units came in to get it going and key installations were guarded to prevent sabotage. It was not until the end of January 1967 that the P.L.A. was openly brought upon the scene and instructed to support the left.

When the leading rightists in any organisation had been isolated, the main problem was to reconcile the various groups, each claiming to be the true supporters of Chairman Mao, that had formed in the course of the struggle. Reconciliation was now the order of the day. Those Party members in the administration who had joined the revolution, representatives of the rebel groups, and members of the P.L.A., were called upon to form a triple alliance in enterprises and institutions of all kinds (in smaller establishments, its militia stood in for the army), and to set about working out a provisional organisation to supervise the activities of the institution and to carry the revolution through to the next phase.

Intervention by the P.L.A. is not at all like what we understand by calling out the troops. In a typical case of intervention, where a dispute between rival groups was interfering with production (for normally production was kept going pretty well and argument took place after hours), five young men turned up with no equipment but some bedding, and held discussions and meetings for three days. Sometimes a reconciliation reached by these means came unstuck after they left and had to be attempted anew. Another chore for the P.L.A. was to get the kids back to school after their heady adventures, for which the army man would use the glamour of his name and enough exercise to sweat the mischief out of them.

At one time, when the Chairman's influence was at its ebb, ranks and badges were introduced into the army, and, as a sop to his point



of view, commanders were required to serve in the ranks from time to time in other units, so as to learn the soldiers' point of view. Now there are no badges and no permanent ranks; the necessary hierarchy is created by appointing suitable men to the appropriate positions of leadership. All eat, sleep, and study the thought of Mao Tse-tung together. The soldiers run farms to feed themselves and go out to help the commune members when they are short-handed. The old guerrilla tradition, that the army are fish swimming in the waters of the people, is cherished more than ever.

As with many aspects of Mao's policy which seem extravagantly idealistic, there is a very practical side to the concept of a classless army. Consider recruitment. The communes offer complete economic security at the level that each has succeeded in reaching. No one now will turn to the army for the old reason—as a refugee from misery. Selective service, when the boys chosen bitterly envy those that remain at home, is not good for morale. For the officer class in any country, however, the army traditionally offers an honourable career, with social status and a tinge of glamour. Candidates are not lacking, and a conventional army can pick and choose the most suitable. This situation exists in China for ordinary recruits. Young men in the militia in every village are eagerly equipping themselves to qualify for the honour of being chosen to serve. Thus an apparently romantic idea is fulfilling a very practical purpose.

#### THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Strange as it may seem to us, the chief civilian duty of the P.L.A. is to help workers, peasants and school teachers with their studies of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Comfortable foreigners, however sympathetic, cannot know what it means when the young soldier, bursting with health and energy, tells them how *his little sisters were sold, during a famine, to keep the rest of the family alive*, or when the well-read Party secretary tells them that his mother was a beggar. They may guess, but cannot feel, the wave of gratitude, at once intimate and exalted, that goes out to all that the name of Mao Tse-tung stands for.

The younger generation, who did not know the old China, are being steeped in this emotion; all China is being steeped in it, apart from the apparently scattered few who refuse to be converted. There is an element in this of personal adoration which would be highly dangerous if its object were affected by it. Mao seems to be using it, very coolly, as a national asset to preserve unity in face of sharp political conflict; indeed, it is hard to see how he could have turned the trick without it.

The main emphasis, however, is not upon the mortal man but on the immortal scriptures.

There is pasture for subtle minds amongst the Selected Works, but the pieces chosen for the widest popularisation are simply written, to touch the hearts and confirm the resolution of peasant soldiers in the long, hard wars that led to the Liberation.

The Thought teaches that the people must be served wholeheartedly, without calculation of loss or gain; that all must be on guard against the sophistries of disguised self-interest. It teaches that problems can be solved; to solve a problem it is necessary to analyse it correctly; mistakes must be examined so as to draw lessons from them; failure must be met with fresh determination; problems must be discussed with others and mutual criticism frankly accepted, whether the problem be cutting a ditch, setting up a political organisation or rooting out false conceptions from one's own mind. The power that moves mountains does not lie in these unexceptionable precepts, but in the resolution simply and sincerely to carry them out.

All this may sound idealistic or even sentimental, but it has a very practical advantage. China still has long years of toil and accumulation of resources lying ahead before she can establish an unassailable position as a great modern nation. High morale is much more economical than incentive wages.

#### INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

Most commentators in the West, it seems, are not much interested in China as the scene of a great historical experiment in human affairs. They want to know only how it will affect *us*.

The Chinese are sometimes accused of xenophobia, by which is meant, presumably, that they have a sense of superiority (damaged during the semi-colonial period) equal to that of the English. In the present movement, the danger is rather the reverse. The patriotism of the Chinese, which runs very deep, is so completely fused with socialist ideology that they do not notice that there is a national element in it. When the young things are singing of Mao Tse-tung as the leader of all the peoples of the world, it does not occur to them that their neighbours, who have national leaders of their own, might think them arrogant or fanatical. Trained to distinguish between the people of a country and its government, they are apparently unaware that *Russian* feelings are wounded by diatribes against Soviet revisionism.

The Chinese leaders are calling more emphatically than ever for a world-wide revolt against imperialism, but they are also insisting more emphatically than ever that each nation must liberate itself by its own efforts. At the same time they have declared that if they are attacked

'frontiers would have no more meaning'. Who is willing to stand as a hostage for the United States?

Meanwhile China continues in her policy of refraining from all but verbal protests under provocations that grow more and more blatant. She has everything to gain by keeping out of trouble. No régime in the world is less in need of foreign distractions.

There is, certainly, a military element in the Cultural Revolution, but it concerns defence in the literal sense, not in the double-talk sense that we are used to. The P.L.A., for all its civilian work, is kept at constant combat readiness; to train a militia, to build up stocks of grain in every village, to inculcate self-reliance, so that local units can carry on when the centre is disrupted—these are preparations to frustrate an attack on their own soil. The H-bomb is a warning not to attempt it.

The military-industrial complex in the United States have an interest in representing China as aggressive, in order to excuse themselves; it is not easy to make their case sound plausible. The Chinese authorities are building up the economy of a huge country, still poor but well equipped with natural resources, and now they have committed themselves to doing so without taking any short cuts, and in a genuinely democratic manner. The Cultural Revolution makes the accusation of aggressiveness less plausible than ever.

#### AS SEEN FROM THE WEST

The view of the Cultural Revolution presented in the Western press has, in general, been incoherent, and China experts who purport to work it out from published documents and occasional transcriptions of posters have not been very helpful.

For example, Mr. Adie<sup>3</sup> extracts from the literature a great number of points which are hard to fit into an intelligible pattern.

So far as internal affairs are concerned, he seems to agree pretty well with the views of the rightists that I have sketched above, and he seems to sympathise with them. He regards their policies as sensible and rational (p. 454) and describes the attacks upon them as a witch hunt (p. 453). The 'economism', which the rebels regarded as a trick to sabotage the Cultural Revolution by bribing workers with money payments, he treats as 'passing the spontaneous demands of the dissidents up to the higher level, which had let them loose in the first place'; he assumes that the children of bourgeois families who had greater facility in passing exams are likely to be more intelligent than the children of peasants (p. 446); and at one point he seems to identify the rightists with 'genuine, internationalist Communists' who are being attacked by 'blind forces of class hatred' (p. 453).

<sup>3</sup> W. A. C. Adie, 'China's Second Liberation', *International Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1967).

But when it comes to the main point, his view of world affairs is so remote from that of the Chinese, whether left or right, as to make the issue between them incomprehensible to him. He totally ignores the threat of an American attack; he regards the refusal of North Vietnam to surrender to bombing as keeping the war going (p. 439); and he describes the Chinese atom bomb as a *force de frappe* (p. 439)—ours, of course, is a deterrent. He therefore fails to observe that the basic issue dividing right from left was the choice between appeasement and self-reliance—a momentous question on which honest men might disagree.

Mr. Adie is even less capable of giving a fair hearing to Mao Tse-tung's point of view. He seems to regard the origin of the Cultural Revolution as an outbreak of 'teenage fanatics and other irrational forces' (p. 440), and he suggests that the Sixteen Points was drafted 'under pressure' from 'unconstitutional bodies' such as groups of Red Guards (p. 450).

This is not plausible. Mao returned to Peking at the very end of July, 1966, and the promulgation of the Sixteen Points by the Central Committee was on August 8. The document bears every mark of having been written by Mao; it is easier to believe that he came to the meeting with a draft already prepared. Moreover, the groups of Red Guards in colleges and rebels in factories report that at that time they were in a small minority, hard-pressed by the rightists; in some parts of the country the movement had been pretty well stamped out. It was after receiving Mao's blessing that the Red Guards began to be a political force.

Internal evidence, also, offers no suggestion that the Sixteen Points was hastily fudged up under outside pressure.

The document opens by pointing out that the right as well as the left has been preparing for the struggle:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 1. A New Stage in the Socialist Revolution.

There are a number of warnings that the struggle will meet with resistance and may experience setbacks; at the same time the struggle itself will educate the people:

Large numbers of revolutionary young people, previously unknown, have become courageous and daring pathbreakers. They are vigorous in action and intelligent.

\* \* \*

In such a great revolutionary movement, it is hardly avoidable that they should show shortcomings of one kind or another, but their main revolutionary orientation has been correct from the beginning. This is the main current in the great proletarian cultural revolution. It is the main direction along which the great proletarian cultural revolution continues to advance.

\* \* \*

Because the resistance is fairly strong, there will be reversals and even repeated reversals in this struggle. There is no harm in this. It tempers the proletariat and other working people, and especially the younger generation, teaches them lessons and gives them experience, and helps them to understand that the revolutionary road is a zigzag one, and not plain sailing.<sup>5</sup>

\* \* \*

In the great proletarian cultural revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things on their behalf must not be used.

Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative. Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder. Chairman Mao has often told us that revolution cannot be so very refined, so gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. Let the masses educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement and learn to distinguish between right and wrong and between correct and incorrect ways of doing things.<sup>6</sup>

\* \* \*

It is normal for the masses to hold different views. Contention between different views is unavoidable, necessary and beneficial. In the course of normal and full debate, the masses will affirm what is right, correct what is wrong and gradually reach unanimity.

\* \* \*

When there is debate it should be conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force.<sup>7</sup>

There is a special section dealing with the position of bourgeois intellectuals:

As regards scientists, technicians and ordinary members of working staffs, as long as they are patriotic, work energetically, are not against the Party and socialism, and maintain no illicit relations with any foreign country, we should in the present movement continue to apply

<sup>5</sup> 2. The Main Current and the Zigzags.

<sup>6</sup> 4. Let the Masses Educate Themselves in the Movement.

<sup>7</sup> 6. Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.

the policy of 'unity, criticism, unity'. Special care should be taken of those scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made contributions. Efforts should be made to help them gradually transform their world outlook and their style of work.<sup>8</sup>

This Mr. Adie describes as 'a compromise . . . stressed by Chou En-lai' (p. 450) but it is by no means an isolated example of moderation and common sense. Throughout the document the emphasis is upon limiting the target of attack, and upon using reason rather than force (though this ruling, regrettably, was not always observed).

The main target of the present movement is those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.

Care should be taken to distinguish strictly between the anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists and those who support the Party and socialism but have said or done something wrong or have written some bad articles or other works.

Care should be taken to distinguish strictly between the reactionary bourgeois scholar despots and 'authorities' on the one hand and people who have the ordinary bourgeois academic ideas on the other.<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \*

A number of persons who suffer from serious ideological errors, and particularly some of the anti-Party and anti-socialist Rightists, are taking advantage of certain shortcomings and mistakes in the mass movement to spread rumours and gossip, and engage in agitation, deliberately branding some of the masses as 'counter-revolutionaries'. It is necessary to beware of such 'pick-pockets' and expose their tricks in good time.<sup>10</sup>

In some ways the most important section is that which deals with the Party:

The cadres fall roughly into the following four categories:

- (1) good;
- (2) comparatively good;
- (3) those who have made serious mistakes but have not become anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists;
- (4) the small number of anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists.

In ordinary situations, the first two categories (good and comparatively good) are the great majority.

The anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists must be fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated. At the same time, they should be given a way out so that they can turn over a new leaf.<sup>11</sup>

This looks forward to the period, which began to be realised fifteen months later, when reconciliation of the rebels with the Party would be the main problem.

<sup>8</sup> 12. Policy Towards Scientists, Technicians and Ordinary Members of Working Staffs.

<sup>9</sup> 5. Firmly Apply the Class Line of the Party.

<sup>10</sup> 7. Be on Guard Against Those Who Brand the Revolutionary Masses as 'Counter-revolutionaries'.

<sup>11</sup> 8. The Question of Cadres.

Long-run developments are also indicated :

The struggle of the proletariat against the old ideas, culture, customs and habits left over from all the exploiting classes over thousands of years will necessarily take a very, very long time. Therefore, the cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses should not be temporary organisations but permanent, standing mass organisations. They are suitable not only for colleges, schools and government and other organisations, but generally also for factories, mines, other enterprises, urban districts and villages.<sup>12</sup>

\* \* \*

In the great proletarian cultural revolution a most important task is to transform the old educational system and the old principles and methods of teaching.

In this great cultural revolution, the phenomenon of our schools being dominated by bourgeois intellectuals must be completely changed.

In every kind of school we must apply thoroughly the policy advanced by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, of education serving proletarian politics and education being combined with productive labour, so as to enable those receiving an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and to become labourers with socialist consciousness and culture.<sup>13</sup>

\* \* \*

The aim of the great proletarian cultural revolution is to revolutionise people's ideology and as a consequence to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in all fields of work. If the masses are fully aroused and proper arrangements are made, it is possible to carry on both the cultural revolution and production without one hampering the other, while guaranteeing high quality in all our work.

The great proletarian cultural revolution is a powerful motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country. Any idea of counterposing the great cultural revolution against the development of production is incorrect.<sup>14</sup>

It is natural enough for Mr. Adie to be out of sympathy with Mao's vision of democratic socialism, but it is hardly fair to the reader to represent it as incoherent fanaticism.

At the end of his article, Mr. Adie suddenly changes sides and identifies the rightists with Stalinism. Then, since Stalin in Western propaganda stands for aggression, Liu Shao-chi (whom the Chinese treat as the arch-appeaser) must have been advocating armed intervention in Vietnam (p. 454). Thus Mr. Adie considers that the Cultural Revolution has made China less dangerous to the outside world (p. 454). However much we differ on the argument, we can agree on the conclusion.

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<sup>12</sup> 9. Cultural Revolutionary Groups, Committees and Congresses.

<sup>13</sup> 10. Educational Reform.

<sup>14</sup> 14. Take Firm Hold of the Revolution and Stimulate Production