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China's "Great Leap Forward"

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that the Shans have been threatening to secede from the Union whenever they disagree on an issue." U Tun Aye pointed out that "this can but lead only to the disintegration of the Union."<sup>44</sup> The resolution never came to a vote because its mover withdrew it at the request of the State government. The State's position was that the question of the right of secession ought to be submitted first to the citizen-residents of the State before the legislature acted. Although the resolution did not pass, its discussion by the State Council marked an important advance on a question which has agitated the political leaders in both the Shan State and Burma Proper.

Finally, in connection with these changes in the Shan State, it must be noted also that the Shan chiefs were reported on March 16, 1959, to have agreed unanimously to surrender their administrative rights to the people in a ceremony which was scheduled to be held in Taunggyi during the last week of April.<sup>45</sup> Throughout the period of debate on these questions General Ne Win and his government officially remained silent and outside the formal discussion of the issues; however, since his words and ideas on national unity were invoked in the debate, and he made no effort to repudiate or alter them, he must be given partial credit for their passage. In addition his government must be credited with having established favorable conditions in connection with Union-state relationships which made it possible to realize the old AFPFL policy of closer unity in theory and practice between Burma Proper and the other states.

It is too early to say whether or not the caretaker government of Ne Win will do more than has been done already toward reconciling the dilemma of Burmese federalism. In fact, one wonders whether more can be done and whether the problem can be solved. As it stands today it seems to be resolving itself in favor of a national culture and national identity. If this is true, then the constitutional provisions for ethnically based states and other protections for minorities are obstacles in the path. A radical change from a federal to a unitary state is out of the question at the present time because of the communal fears and antipathies engendered during the past decade in the struggle for ethnic equality and the protection of cultural pluralism. The solution might be found if the Union government adopted a set of principles for statehood such as was proposed by the AFPFL in May 1947 or if it based statehood on the principle of administrative efficiency or decentralization rather than as a guarantee for the preservation of ethnic and cultural diversity. In this way

the confusion between politics and culture might be partially resolved. A second step needs to be taken in the area of education: it is necessary to carry out more systematic studies of the histories, cultures and languages of all the peoples in Burma as sources for a truly national culture.<sup>46</sup>

Only by ending the policy of forced Burmanization and by encouraging the gradual growth of a Burmese culture which recognizes its rich and diverse sources can the people be drawn together in a viable national unity. The official doctrine of unity in diversity served to unite the people and create an independent state ten years ago. Mutual jealousies and suspicions, memories of past history and unequal treatment have kept the people apart since that time. The dual policy of the past government undercut the federal solution as a safeguard for the minorities and contributed to a loss of faith in AFPFL leadership. The activities of the present government have reversed some of the more unfortunate practices of the past and have succeeded thus far in trying to revitalize federalism in Burma. J. S. Furnivall, in his latest monograph, goes to the heart of the matter when he writes that in Burma, "the main function of government is to create unity in a disintegrated social order."<sup>47</sup> General Ne Win's government is attempting to carry out this task, but it still remains to be seen whether or not the federal dilemma of the past decade will be resolved.

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46 Steps toward creating a national culture are outlined by the Union Government in "Union Culture," *Burma, The Eleventh Anniversary*, pp. 28-34.

47 J. S. Furnivall, *The Governance of Modern Burma*, *op. cit.*, p. iv.

## China's "Great Leap Forward"

BY THEODORE SHABAD

Perhaps China's most spectacular gains in 1958 were achieved in the output of crops. The Chinese reported the doubling of yields per unit area in many crop categories, arousing the skepticism of some Western observers. The remarkable yield increases were attributed by the Chinese to application of an eight-point program of agricultural techniques, calling for soil improvement, fertilizer, water conservancy, seed selection, close planting, plant protection, field management and tool reform. Chou En-lai described the implementation of this program as follows:

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The first part of this article appeared in the June 1959 issue of the *Far Eastern Survey*.

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44 *The Nation*, March 12, 1959, p. 8; for an extensive discussion of the Council and Parliamentary debates on this amendment see *The Nation*, March 3-18, 1959, and *The Guardian* (daily), March 11-15, 1959.

45 *The Nation*, March 16, 1959, p. 1.

In the case of soil improvement, a great amount of work was done to deep-plow the land, improve soil fertility and level the fields. In the case of fertilizer, in 1958, bigger sources of fertilizer were tapped than in previous years and large numbers of factories and workshops were built to make and process all kinds of fertilizer. In water conservancy, irrigation was brought to an additional 32 million hectares of land in 1958, an increase of 90 percent compared with the preceding year. In seed selection, improved strains were popularized for such major crops as rice, wheat and cotton, and improved strains were exchanged between different areas. Close planting in varying degrees was practiced extensively and much experience was gained in experiments with rational close planting. Much was also done in plant protection and the elimination of plant diseases and insect pests. In 1958, notable achievements were registered in field management; high-yielding fields and experimental plots were popularized everywhere; intensive and meticulous garden-style cultivation of farm lands was put into trial practice in some places. Tool reform made initial headway all over the country; all sorts of vehicles were used to replace the shoulder-pole and the use of ballbearings was popularized; new farm tools of all types were developed in large numbers.<sup>14</sup>

Irrigation was undoubtedly an important factor in yield increases. The total area under irrigation rose by 14.5 million hectares during the First Five-Year Plan, from 21.1 million hectares in 1952 to 35.6 million in 1957. The largest yearly increase was achieved in 1956, when 7.9 million hectares were added to the irrigated area. In 1958, however, the great leap resulted in the additional irrigation of 32 million hectares, raising the total irrigated area by the end of 1958 to 67.6 million hectares. The 1959 plan calls for the addition of 6.7 million hectares to the irrigated area. An important consequence of the gains in irrigation has been an increase in the cropped area. The total area under cultivation in China has been relatively constant in recent years, having increased by only 3.9 million hectares, or 3.6 percent (from 107.9 million hectares in 1952 to 111.8 million in 1957), and in 1958 the total area under cultivation was about 112 million hectares. The total cropped area, on the other hand, has increased more rapidly because of a more widespread use of multiple cropping, made possible in part through increased irrigation facilities. The total cropped area increased from 141.3 million hectares in 1952 to 157.2 million in 1957, a rise of 15.9 million hectares, or 13.5 percent. The intensive efforts of 1958 demonstrated that higher yields could be obtained from the present area under cultivation, and the Chinese authorities decided against further expansion of the cultivated area; in fact, they took measures to cut back some of the less productive acreage. According to the 1959 plan, the total cropped

area was scheduled to be reduced to 140 million hectares from the 158 million hectares of 1958. Agricultural land statistics (Table 11) show that this decrease was to take place mainly in the food-crop sector while an increase in the sown area was planned for cotton in 1959.

TABLE 11. AGRICULTURAL LAND  
(in million hectares)

	1952	1957	1958	1959	Plan
Cultivated land	107.9	111.8	112		
Irrigated land	21.1	35.6	67.6	74.3	
Total cropped area	141.3	157.2	158	140	
Food crop area	112.3	120.5	121.3	106.7	
Cotton area	5.6	5.7	5.7	6.7	

The decision to cut back the cropped land area was evidently taken somewhat rashly while China's agricultural planners were still flushed with the unusual farm record of 1958. An editorial published in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) on June 11, 1959 took a more realistic approach. It said that the policy of aiming for high yields from less land was a good long-term plan but that it could not be implemented until China's agriculture was equipped with sufficient tractors and other machinery, chemical fertilizers, effective insecticides and modern insect-control equipment. Under present conditions, the editorial said, it is to be expected that agricultural output will remain uneven and that a record crop will be followed by a poorer one. The editorial countermanded the earlier acreage-reduction plan and stressed the need for cultivating all available arable land in the second half of 1959.

The policy reversal was evidently brought about in part by crop setbacks in the first half of the year. Drought was reported from areas north of the Yellow River and Manchuria. Unusually heavy rains fell in various parts of the country in May and June, interfering with the winter wheat harvest and flooding farm lands planted in cotton, rice and vegetables. The worst emergency was in the rice-growing province of Kwangtung, where torrential storms and resulting inundations caused serious damage to crops. Although damaged rice paddies were replanted to soybeans, potatoes, cabbages, turnips and other late food crops, it was evident that China's 1959 crop had received a serious blow.

Under Chinese Communist definition, food crops include not only grains (rice, wheat, corn, kaoliang, millet and others) but root crops, such as potatoes and yams. Until 1955, the statistics also included soybeans, but since 1956 soybeans have been excluded and listed separately. It will be seen from Table 12 that rice, a wet-field crop, benefited particularly from the large increase in irrigation works in 1958. Total rice produc-

<sup>14</sup> *Peking Review*, April 21, 1959.

tion rose from 86.8 million tons in 1957 to 150 million in 1958, the most significant increases being achieved in double-cropped rice lands. Sharp increases were also achieved in other high-yielding food crops, such as corn, potatoes and yams. In 1958, rice accounted for 40 percent of all food crops, potatoes and yams for 25 percent, wheat for 11 percent and other grains for 24 percent. The 1959 goal for total food-crop production of 525 million tons will evidently not be fulfilled.

TABLE 12. FOOD CROP PRODUCTION  
(in million tons)

	1952	1956	1957	1958
All food crops	154.4	182.5	185	375
Rice*	68.4	82.5	86.8	150
Early			19.3	43.5
Semi-late			41.5	56.5
Late			26	50
Wheat	18.1	24.8	23.6	40
Winter			20.6	34.5
Spring			3	5.5
Other grains	51.5	53.4	52.7	90
Corn			21.4	45
Kaoliang			7.7	9
Millet			8.6	15
Barley, oats, etc.			15	21
Potatoes and yams†	16.3	21.9	21.9	95

\* The early and late rice crops are obtained from double-cropped land, semi-late rice from single-cropped land.

† For use in food-crop statistics, the output of potatoes and yams is converted into so-called grain equivalent at a ratio of 4:1. The actual tonnage of these root crops for the four years indicated was (in millions): 65.2; 87.6; 87.6; 380.

While major gains were achieved in food crops, the production of oilseeds has lagged. The slow progress in this sector of agriculture is reflected in the low production of edible vegetable oils, which failed to meet the Five-Year Plan goal originally set for 1957. The principal Chinese oilseeds are soybeans, a leading export item, and peanuts and rapeseed, which are consumed largely at home. Oilseed production of recent years is shown in Table 13.

TABLE 13. OILSEED PRODUCTION  
(in million tons)

	1952	1956	1957	1958	1959 Plan
Soybeans	9.5	10.2	10.0	12.5	15
Peanuts	2.3	3.3	2.6	4	6
Rapeseed	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.6

Cotton production, the basis for the Chinese textile industry, increased by only 26 percent during the First Five-Year Plan, and was inadequate to meet the needs

of the country's textile mills. Some cotton imports continued to be necessary during this period. During 1958, the cotton crop, based on past experience, was initially planned for 1.75 million tons, a modest increase over 1957, but unexpectedly high yields resulted in a crop twice as large as that of 1957. Further crop increases were expected for 1959, based on both continuing high yields and an expansion of the sown area from 5.7 to 6.7 million hectares. Recent cotton crop figures (in terms of ginned cotton) are shown in Table 14.

TABLE 14. GINNED COTTON CROP  
(in million tons)

1952	1.3
1953	1.2
1954	1.1
1955	1.5
1956	1.4
1957	1.6
1958	3.3
1959 Plan	5

Output of other fibers has been less satisfactory. The production of jute and ambary hemp dropped from 305,000 tons in 1952 (a result of sharp acreage cuts) and recovered only in 1957. In 1958 there was an 8 percent increase, to 325,000 tons, and the 1959 planned output was set at 500,000 tons. The production of ramie, a silk-like vegetable fiber, rose from 40,500 tons in 1952 to 52,500 tons in 1957. Preliminary crop data gave 1958 production as about 75,000 tons. Tobacco was heavily affected by the great leap. After an unsteady production record during the First Five-Year Plan, in which output rose from 222,000 tons in 1952 to 399,000 in 1956, dropping again to 256,000 in 1957, production more than doubled in 1958, reaching a record level of 550,000 tons.

TABLE 15. SUGAR CROP PRODUCTION  
(in million tons)

	1952	1956	1957	1958	1959 Plan
Sugar cane	7.1	8.7	10.4	13.5	20
Sugar beets	0.5	1.6	1.5	2.9	5.5

Of China's two sources of sugar (cane and beets) the greatest advances in recent years have been achieved by beets. While the cane area has remained relatively stable, beet acreages have been expanding at a rapid rate in northern Manchuria and in irrigated lands of Inner Mongolia. Sugar crop production for recent years appears in Table 15.

Tea, a traditional Chinese crop that had its heyday in the early 1930's, is gradually returning toward former output levels. During the First Five-Year Plan, production of tea leaves rose from 82,400 tons (1952) to 120,400 tons (1956). After a setback in 1957, when output dropped to 111,500 tons, tea production reached 141,000 tons in 1958.

The production of silk cocoons, another traditional Chinese commodity, has been erratic during the First Five-Year Plan, especially in the case of wild cocoons (which feed on oak leaves in the Shantung and Liaotung peninsulas); their production was 61,100 tons in 1952, dropped to 12,300 tons in 1953 and continued to fluctuate in subsequent years. The output of domestic silk cocoons, produced by silkworms feeding on mulberry leaves, maintained a somewhat steadier level. Table 16 shows the production of silk cocoons for recent years.

TABLE 16. SILK COCOON OUTPUT  
(in thousands of tons)

	1952	1956	1957	1958
Domestic silk	62.2	72.4	67.5	80.7*
Wild silk	61.1	61.8	44.0	60.7*

\* Preliminary figures.

The production of Chinese fisheries rose from 1.7 million tons of fish and other marine products in 1952 to 3.1 million tons in 1957. In the course of 1958 fishery production targets were successively increased beyond the initial goal of 3.5 million tons. By September, 8.2 million tons was listed as the expected year-end total, but no information on the 1958 fish catch was given in the official communiqué on economic progress in 1958.

Except for hogs, China's animal husbandry continues to lag behind the achievements in the crop-raising sector. Hogs were the only livestock category in which the Five-Year Plan was fulfilled, the numbers rising from 89.2 million in 1952 to 145.9 million in 1957. Further advances were recorded in 1958, when hog numbers rose to 180 million, and the 1959 goal was set at 280 million. Goats and sheep increased from 61.8 million in 1952 to 98.6 million in 1957, but the original 1957 goal (113 million) had still not been fulfilled by 1958, when sheep and goats totaled 108.9 million head. The 1959 target for sheep and goats is 120 million. Draft animals (cattle, water buffaloes, horses, donkeys and mules), which compete more than the other livestock for feed with the farm population, have not fared well under the system of collectives and communes in the Chinese countryside. Crop-raising efforts continue to absorb most of the attention of the Chinese

peasantry at the expense of animal husbandry. The total number of draft animals in 1952 was 76 million, and the 1957 goal was set at 98 million but this may not be achieved for several years more. The total number of draft animals reached about 84 million in 1957 and rose slightly to 85 million in 1958. The 1959 goal is 90 million.

The afforestation program is another area in which a great advance was evident in 1958. During the entire First Five-Year Plan, 14 million hectares were afforested, of which 6.2 million hectares were planted with timber trees. Total tree plantings were 5.7 million hectares in 1956 and about 4.5 million hectares in 1957, but in 1958 about 26 million hectares were afforested, almost twice as much as in the entire five-year period.

In transportation, railroad construction, which slowed considerably in 1957, continued again at a rapid pace in 1958. The Paotow-Lanchow railroad was completed, Foochow and Kweiyang were reached by railroads for the first time, and work continued on the Sinkiang transcontinental line and other railroads. The total length of operating trunk and branch railroads (excluding special industrial lines) rose from 24,232 kilometers in 1952 to 29,862 in 1957 and 31,193 in 1958. The rail-laying program for 1959 is planned for 5,500 kilometers of track, including special industrial lines and double-tracking. An important part of the 1959 program will be the laying of short branch lines to increase the utilization of existing trunk railroads. The increasing use of railroads for freight transportation is reflected in tonnage figures for recent years. The total railroad freight rose from 160 million tons in 1952 to 273 million in 1957 and 380 million in 1958. The 1959 plan calls on the railroads to carry 520 million tons.

A nation-wide road-building effort in 1958 added 150,000 kilometers of roads of all kinds compared with about 17,000 kilometers built in 1957. The 1958 effort brought the total length of the Chinese road net to 400,000 kilometers. Dredging and reconstruction of the ancient Grand Canal, much of it silted up for more than 100 years, was started in 1958. Dredging and other work opened an additional 10,000 kilometers of waterways to junk traffic in 1958, bringing the total length of Chinese waterways to 150,000 kilometers. Of this total, 40,000 kilometers are navigable by steam vessels. Airline services were also expanded from 26,000 kilometers in 1957 to 33,000 in 1958, Chinese plane services being extended to Rangoon, Hanoi and Pyongyang in addition to points in the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

Foreign trade increased by 62 percent in the First Five-Year Plan, rising from 6.5 billion yuan in 1952 to 10.5 billion in 1957, after having reached an earlier peak of 11 billion yuan in 1955. A 23 percent increase in China's foreign trade brought the volume to 12.9

billion yuan in 1958. About 50 percent of China's trade continues to be with the Soviet Union. The excess of Chinese imports over exports that dominated Soviet-Chinese trade until 1955 has now been reversed as China has begun to pay back Soviet credits in the form of increased exports.

On the labor front, the great leap of 1958 resulted in a large increase in the number of salaried office and industrial workers, from an average of 24 million persons in 1957 to 32 million in 1958. The proportion of workers in industry, construction, transportation and other productive sectors of the economy rose from 73 percent of the 1957 total to 85 percent in 1958. The average wage of industrial and office workers in 1957 was 637 yuan, having risen from 446 yuan in 1952.

TABLE 17. STUDENT ENROLLMENT

	1952	1956	1957	1958
Primary (millions)	51.1	63.5	64	86
Secondary (millions)	3.1	6.0	7	12
Higher (thousands)	194	408	440	660

Advances were also registered in education as student enrollment rose sharply during the great leap. In 1958,

there were 86 million primary school students, and 85 percent of all school-age children attended schools. Table 17 shows enrollment in primary schools, secondary schools and higher educational institutions for recent years.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that in many respects the production goals set by Chinese economic planners for 1959 assumed a continuation of the frantic pace achieved in 1958. Scattered economic reports published in the first half of 1959 do not give a comprehensive picture of progress. It has become evident, however, that the ambitious food-crop plan of 525 million tons will not be fulfilled because of drought, floods and other natural catastrophes. In fact, it is possible that total food production will fall below the 1958 level of 375 million tons. On the other hand, industrial production appears to be increasing more or less according to plan, at least in some of the basic commodities. Coal output in the first five months of 1959 is reported to have doubled compared with the same period of 1958. Large increases have also been reported by the iron and steel industry. The economic half-year report, customarily issued by the Chinese in July or August, may provide a fuller assessment of economic progress achieved thus far in 1959.

## BOOKS ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

THREE ESSAYS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF COMMUNIST CHINA. Edited by C. F. Remer. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1959. 221 pp. \$6.00.

This is a collection of three research papers prepared by members of a "workshop" in the economics of Chinese communism in the Economics Department of the University of Michigan. According to the editor's preface, it was hoped originally that a "single integrated statement" would result from this enterprise. This having become impossible, the three essays were brought out as a separate publication. The essays are preceded by an introduction, in which Dr. Remer tries to outline some of the difficulties encountered by researchers in dealing with Communist China. The point of greatest concern to him seems to be that China's present hostility to the United States makes it difficult for Americans to arrive at fair and objective findings with respect to China.

The first essay, entitled "International Economics and the Rise of Chinese Communism," is also by Dr. Remer. Using an obscure style of exposition that this reviewer found hard to follow, the author presents a philosophical interpretation of the Chinese Communist revolution, seeking to explain the rise of Chinese Communism in terms of various theoretical concepts of imperialism. He appears to view Chinese Communism as part of a great Chinese revolution in which international economic relations are playing a significant role. How-

ever, the precise connection does not emerge clearly from the discussion.

The second essay, "The First Five-Year Plan and its International Aspects," is by Feng-hwa Mah, a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan. Going over what is by now rather familiar ground, Mr. Mah traces the development of the Chinese economy during the rehabilitation period (1949-52) and the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), calculates national income in the Five-Year Plan compared with national income in the 1930's, and discusses the role of Soviet loans and foreign trade in the Five-Year Plan. The essay is heavily laced with statistical tables that try to reconcile inconsistencies encountered in Chinese Communist sources for both output plans and actual production. A spot check of the grain output figures shows, however, that despite laborious calculations and cross-calculations, the author was misled by a change in statistical definition. Chinese grain figures included soybeans for the years 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955, but excluded them for 1956 and 1957. Comparing the 1957 output of 185 million tons (excluding soybeans) with the original 1957 goal of 192.81 million tons (including soybeans), Mr. Mah mistakenly shows grain underfulfillment by 7.81 million tons (p. 110). Actually, in terms of comparable figures, 1957 grain output (without soybeans) was 3.41 million tons above the original 1957 target.

The last essay, "The International Trade of Communist China," by Robert F. Dernberger, a research assistant at the University of Michigan, discusses China's foreign trade in terms of its institutional setting, comparisons between the Five-Year Plan period and the 1930's, total value of trade in the Communist period, direction of trade and commodity composition. Appendices list the provisions of all foreign economic agreements concluded by Communist China, and seek